Objective: People who believe that cancer has both genetic and behavioral risk factors have more accurate mental models of cancer causation and may be more likely to engage in cancer screening behaviors than people who do not hold such multifactorial causal beliefs. This research explored possible health cognitions and emotions that might produce such differences.
| BACKGROUND
Cancer, like many common health conditions, arises from a complex interplay of genetic, behavioral, and environmental factors. Understanding this multifactorial nature of cancer is an important component of genomic health literacy, because this knowledge can help individuals to obtain, process, and use the rapidly evolving and increasingly available genomic information to guide their personal health decisions. 1 Yet there is variability in the extent to which individuals recognize the multifactorial etiology of cancer. For instance, our work has demonstrated that among the American public, 64.3% believe that cancer is caused by both genetics and lifestyle (ie, multifactorial causal beliefs). 2 Beliefs about disease causation are recognized as contributing to engagement in relevant health behaviors, 3, 4 and there is evidence to suggest that multifactorial causal beliefs are related to the adoption of preventive behaviors. Specifically, endorsement of multifactorial causal beliefs about cancer has been significantly associated with screening behaviors related to breast, cervical, colorectal, and prostate cancer. 2 However, it is unclear how these multifactorial causal beliefs may ultimately shape behaviors-that is, whether multifactorial causal beliefs are associated with other cognitive and affective variables that theory and research have identified as precursors to the adoption of health behaviors.
Cognitive and affective factors that motivate healthy behaviors, such as perceived likelihood of disease, 5, 6 feelings of risk, [7] [8] [9] and worry about disease, 6 are likely informed by an individual's understanding of disease causation. 10 For example, among gynecological cancer survivors, endorsement of various singular causes of gynecological cancer (eg, genetics, environment, lifestyle, and diet) was associated with increased worry about cancer recurrence. 11 Similarly, among healthy college students, beliefs about heredity, sunburns, and sun exposure as causes of skin cancer were correlated with heightened absolute perceptions of skin cancer risk and worry. 12 However, research also suggests that an understanding of genetic risk factors, in particular, may have negative effects on health cognitions. For instance, in an experimental study, providing information about genetic risk factors for salt-sensitive blood pressure and high cholesterol led to decreased absolute perceptions of risk for these conditions among individuals who were previously unaware of such risk factors. 13 Additionally, among adult smokers participating in a smoking cessation trial, those who believed that genetics contributed to their smoking perceived less control over their behavior.
14 Although past research demonstrates that diverse, singular causal beliefs are associated with cognitive and affective motivators of behavior, to date, no study has explored how multifactorial causal beliefs are related to these factors. Thus, the objective of the present study was to examine the extent to which multifactorial causal beliefs about cancer are associated with cancer risk cognitions and emotions.
Specifically, we evaluated a previously unexplored link in a conceptual framework that we have developed and adapted, 2, 15 and which is informed by theoretical and empirical work from psychology, communication, public health, and genomic medicine. 3, 4, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] As shown in Figure 1 products such as makeup, fragrances, hair products, etc.
| Covariates
Based on our prior research examining predictors of multifactorial beliefs, 2,15 several variables were included as covariates. These included age, sex, education, race/ethnicity, rural/urban geographic residence, numeracy, family history of cancer, awareness of direct-toconsumer genetic testing, motivation to process cancer information, and health information scanning.
| Analytic strategy
In accordance with published recommendations, 26 data were analyzed using SAS 9.4 SURVEYFREQ and SURVEYREG procedures with jackknife variance estimation. These procedures account for the survey's complex design and sampling scheme and therefore reduce the likelihood of a type I error. 28 The results were also weighted using the weights provided in the public use datasets to obtain estimates that are representative of the US adult population.
There were 3630 survey respondents, but our use of listwise deletion resulted in a primary analytic sample comprised of the subset of 2719 individuals who provided complete data for all items of interest.
The final analytic sample excludes the 468 cancer survivors because they were not asked to complete the risk perception items. 
| Factor analysis and scale construction
The 8 worry about environmental exposure items were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis using varimax rotation. To represent each factor in subsequent analyses, 2 scales were created by averaging the value of the individual items that loaded on each factor. The internal consistency for Ingested Exposures was α Cronbach = 0.89, and for Emanating Exposures, it was α Cronbach = 0.87.
| Main analyses
3.3.1 | Unadjusted analyses
As depicted in Table 2 , respondents who endorsed multifactorial beliefs about cancer had higher absolute perceived risk of cancer (P = .002), higher feelings of cancer risk (P = .003), and lower pessimism about the preventability of cancer (P < .0001) compared with people who did not endorse multifactorial beliefs. Multifactorial beliefs were also associated with higher self-reported worry about potentially toxic environmental exposures that could be ingested (P = .005) or exposures that emanate from consumer and medical products (P = .02).
Endorsement of multifactorial beliefs was not associated with comparative risk perceptions, the belief that "everything causes cancer," or Information scanning, motivation to process information, cancer cognitions, and worry were measured on a scale of 1 to 4. Risk perceptions were measured on a scale of 1 to 5. In all cases, higher scores indicated more agreement. Use of listwise deletion yielded an analytic sample of N = 2719 with no missing data on any of the items.
that there are "too many recommendations" about cancer prevention strategies (all Ps > .05).
| Adjusted analyses
The strength of the relationships between multifactorial beliefs and risk perceptions, cancer cognitions, and worry about environmental exposures were attenuated after adjusting for the covariates (Table 2 ), but only feelings of risk was no longer statistically significant (P = .06). Multifactorial beliefs remained statistically significantly related to absolute risk perceptions (P = .02), beliefs about the preventability of cancer (P = .0004), and worry about ingested (P = .02) and emanating (P = .04) toxic environmental exposures.
| Exploratory analyses
To better understand our findings, we conducted additional exploratory analyses to identify which covariate accounted for the most variance between multifactorial beliefs and feelings of risk. To accomplish this, we compared the point estimate and P value of the fully adjusted model to the point estimate and P value of a model that excluded only one of the covariates (eg, age). We repeated this comparison process for each of the covariates individually. Results indicated that removing family history of cancer from the model resulted in the largest increase in the point estimate, from 0.10 to 0.15 (ie, a 50% increase). The associated P value for the association between multifactorial beliefs and feelings of risk in the model with all covariates except family history was P = .023. This association did not reach statistical significance in any of the remaining models in which other covariates were removed.
| DISCUSSION
The present study confirms that multifactorial causal beliefs about cancer are associated with cognitive and affective factors that drive healthy behavior. With the use of nationally representative survey data collected from the US population and adjusting for a number of relevant covariates, these results demonstrate that multifactorial causal beliefs are associated with perceptions of cancer risk, cancer cognitions, and worry about toxic environmental exposures.
As predicted in hypothesis 1, multifactorial causal beliefs were significantly associated with various dimensions of perceived cancer risk.
In both unadjusted and adjusted analyses, multifactorial causal beliefs were associated with heightened absolute perceptions of risk, consistent with past research involving singular causal beliefs. 12, 13 Multifactorial causal beliefs were also associated with affective perceived risk, although this relationship became weaker and nonsignificant when relevant covariates were included in the model. Exploratory analyses indicated that the decreased magnitude and significance of this association was attributable to the inclusion of family history in the model. This finding suggests that the unadjusted association between endorsing multifactorial beliefs and having higher feelings of risk may be due to negative affect associated with having a family history of cancer. If this were the case, it would be consistent with the affect heuristic's assertion that the affect generated from personal experiences has a key role in determining the extent to which something is perceived as "risky." [7] [8] [9] Future research should investigate this possibility. Such research could use more extensive measures of family history than were available in the present study, which may provide additional insight into these associations.
Contrary to hypothesis 1, no association was observed between multifactorial causal beliefs and comparative perceived risk. Past research has confirmed that while perceived risk is a multidimensional construct, 29 these different aspects of perceived risk can have varying associations with attitudes, emotions, and behavioral intentions. 27, 30, 31 Comparative perceptions of risk are derived from a social comparison process 32 wherein people judge their personal risk by estimating and contrasting the risk of others. These perceptions were uniquely unrelated to multifactorial causal beliefs. One possibility for this null effect is that it may be particularly challenging for an individual to apply her or his understanding of the multifactorial etiology of a disease to the estimation of another's vulnerability to that disease, because this Adjusted analyses included the following covariates: age, sex, education, race, geographic residence, numeracy, family history, awareness of direct-to-consumer genetic testing, motivation to process cancer information, and health information scanning. Bolded values indicate statistical significance (P < .05).
a Higher scores on these items indicate more agreement.
would require information that the individual may not have, such as estimating the extent to which others have been exposed to multiple disease-causing risk factors (eg, lifestyle habits, environmental exposures, and heredity).
Yet ample research suggests that lack of information does not stop people from formulating comparative risk perceptions and using those perceptions to guide behavior. 33 Instead, people engage in a cognitive process in which they formulate comparative risk judgments by evaluating their personal risk-increasing and risk-reducing factors, but then neglect to account for other people's risk-reducing factors. 34 This is thought to be a self-serving action that helps maintain a positive view of the self, especially for hazards that are thought to be under personal 
